Job loss leads to dramatic and lasting reductions in the employment levels of older workers. Employment rates of workers losing jobs after age 50, for example, remain at least 20 percentage points below those of not displaced workers for up to four years. 1 As we show below, job loss after age 50 roughly doubles the annual probability of retirement. Some part of this post-displacement joblessness likely reflects difficulty finding new employment due to the loss of firm-specific skills, employers' unwillingness to invest in workers near the end of their careers, high search costs, or other barriers to reemployment such as age discrimination. But because job loss alters the earnings, pensions and wealth available to workers, some part of this reduced employment will also represent voluntary retirement in light of changed retirement incentives. Distinguishing these two motives is important for developing and evaluating policies to assist older displaced workers. For example, labor market policies that tackle barriers to reemployment and promote the retraining of older workers will be inappropriate if many workers are simply reacting to altered financial incentives.
Our goal is to estimate how much of the reduced employment following job loss among older workers can be explained as a best response to altered pension incentives and earnings opportunities. We do this by examining retirement behavior after job loss using an optimal retirement model similar to those used in recent empirical work on retirement. Our empirical analysis uses data from the Health and Retirement Study and proceeds in two stages. We first examine how workers' earnings, assets, pensions and the resulting financial incentive to retire are affected by job loss. We then estimate models of the retirement decision which take these changed retirement incentives into account, along with any additional effects of displacement that are not captured by retirement incentives.
We find important effects of job loss on the main financial components of workers' incentive to retire. Labor earnings fall sharply as does the gain in pension wealth from continued work. While the level of pension wealth is not significantly altered, we find a substantial reduction in the gain in pension wealth from deferring retirement. These effects significantly reduce the incentive to work and delay retirement following job loss. However, the observed increased rates of retirement among displaced workers go far beyond these purely financial considerations. We find that very little of the reduced employment among older job losers can be explained by changes in pension-related retirement incentives. Other barriers to reemployment may be more important explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes our model of retirement decision-making and the empirical strategy for its implementation. Section 2 presents the data we use in the subsequent analysis. Section 3 gives results from the effects of job loss on components of the incentive to retire, while section 4 presents the results of our retirement decision estimation. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Retirement Decision and Job Loss

The option value model of retirement
The literature on the determinants of retirement has emphasized the importance of future retirement income accumulation that comes from Social Security benefit formulas and pension structures. The underlying behavioral assumption is that individuals decide whether to retire based on an evaluation of lifetime utility associated with current and future retirement dates. 2 The approach that we take in this paper also adopts this fundamental idea. Our estimating framework is most directly related to the regression-based implementations of the Stock and Wise (1990) option value model of retirement, first discussed in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) . We briefly summarize this methodology and subsequent applications.
In the original Stock and Wise (1990) presentation, individuals chose their retirement date, R, to maximize a lifetime utility function V, that is based on streams of income while working and while retired: where β is a subjective discount factor, U w is utility during working years, U R is utility while retired, Y is income while working, B is retirement benefits or income while retired, and S is the final period. Stock and Wise implement the optimization undertaken here with a simplification of the full dynamic programming rule: in every period t individuals compare the lifetime utility of retiring at time t with the lifetime utility of retiring at a future "optimal" date, R t * , the retirement date at which lifetime utility is maximized. This difference between the utility from immediate retirement and the utility from delayed optimal retirement is referred to as the option value of work or delayed retirement,
2 Estimated structural models of retirement, including Rust (1989) , Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) , Stock and Wise (1990) and Rust and Phelan (1997) , all share this same basic feature.
Regression-based applications of this model involve calculating the option value variable Z t (or some close counterpart) and estimating its effect on retirement. As shown by Stock and Wise in their original and subsequent work, and by Samwick (1998) and Coile and Gruber (2000) , the option value is a comprehensive measure of future retirement incentives that has greater explanatory power than measures based on the one-year accrual of retirement wealth or the level of retirement wealth.
These empirical implementations require a formulation of the utility function in [1] and recent applications have either assumed a particular functional form for utility (often with assumed values for the utility function parameters), or have alternatively assumed that the present value of pension wealth (rather than utility) is maximized. The original Stock and Wise formulation is an example of the first approach. Their utility in each period is based on a function of current period income, either from earnings or from pension benefits, with no saving and borrowing between periods. Samwick (1998) also used this approach with assumed utility parameters. Coile and Gruber (2000) is an example of the second approach: they simply take the difference of pension wealth if retirement occurs at the wealth-maximizing age and pension wealth if retirement occurs immediately. We refer to this measure as "pension gain," since it reflects the gain in pension wealth associated with deferring retirement to a future optimal date. 3 The concept is nested in the option value framework, but focuses only on the pension component, ignoring income, assets, and the value of leisure in retirement.
Empirical implementation of the retirement model in light of job loss
Our empirical strategy is to estimate the effects of job loss on components of option value and option value itself, and then to examine the extent to which such forward-looking incentive measures capture some of the effects of a previous job loss on retirement. We do this by estimating models that include both the option value measure (constructed as in equation [2] ) and a dummy variable indicating a previous job loss. If some of the reduced employment following job loss reflects a rational response to altered pension and wage incentives, including option value in the retirement equation should diminish the estimated effect of job loss.
In our analyses below, we use both the utility and pension wealth approaches discussed above. For the utility approach, given our focus on job loss, we deviate from Stock and Wise and use a utility function that depends on lifetime income and that allows individuals to smooth consumption between time periods. Specifically, we assume a period utility function that is additively separable in consumption and leisure, with the consumption component described by constant relative risk aversion utility and the leisure component taking on a fixed value U L . Thus, the individual's decision at time t can be stated as choosing the retirement age R that will maximize their lifetime utility V t subject to a lifetime budget constraint:
where c is consumption, 1/α is the risk aversion parameter, R is the retirement date, S is the termination date, β is the subjective discount factor, A is the stock of assets, y is income and i is the real interest rate. The appendix gives more details on the derivation and assumptions behind this functional form, as well as its empirical implementation using the Health and Retirement Study data. Our approach makes clear that displacement should affect the retirement decision through its effects on future earnings, asset holdings, and future pension benefits.
To implement the non-utility-based option value model, we use "pension gain" instead of option value. This is simply the difference in the present value of pension wealth if retirement occurs immediately versus if it is deferred until pension wealth is maximized.
Data
We use data from the first four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), conducted every two years beginning in 1992. We first limit our sample to individuals between 50 and 75 years of age with complete information on the starting and ending dates of jobs held at each of the four waves. 4 To capture individuals who are at risk for both displacement and retirement, we require individuals to be working at the time of the wave 1 survey. Further, because we rely on self-reported pension information (discussed further below), we must eliminate individuals who report having a pension, but who do not have sufficient information on the type or details of that pension.
5 Our final sample contains 3,539 men and 3,431 women. Of the individuals in our final sample, 15.8 percent of men and 16.7 percent of women experience a job displacement at some time between the wave 1 and the wave 4 surveys.
To track job loss among older workers in the HRS, we use the extensive information on earnings and employment collected at each survey wave, including information on job changes that took place between the waves. We take as our sample of displaced workers those who respond that their job ended when either (1) the "business closed" or (2) they were "laid off or let go." While the second part of this definition may include some individuals fired for cause, we include them for consistency with many recent definitions of displaced workers. 6 Other possible responses to the question about how the previous job ended include "quit", "retired", "temporary layoff", and "wanted a better job." In order to have some pre-displacement information for all included job losses, we do not make use of job losses prior to wave 1 that are reported at the time of the wave 1 survey.
In wave 1, information is collected on pension eligibility, structure, and benefit amounts for both current jobs and jobs that have ended. Then, at each subsequent wave, respondents are asked whether their pension information has changed and what those changes are, or to give pension information for any new job since the last survey wave. Ultimately, for any job reported in the HRS, information is collected on up to three different pension plans associated with that job. Although pension-provider data matched to the HRS files have been used by many other researchers to forecast and analyze pension wealth, these are available for wave 1 pensions only. Given our focus on changes in pension incentives following job loss, we rely on the self-reports that are available at every wave; this is the only available source of detailed longitudinal data on private pension wealth and eligibility rules among displaced workers.
7 Concerns have been raised regarding the accuracy and completeness of self-reported pensions in the HRS. Steinmeier (2001a, 2001b) show that many individuals do not correctly report their pension type, and very few are aware of the details of pensions such as retirement ages and benefit amounts. While this is a concern, our view is that the self-reports reflect individuals' actual understanding of their own pensions and it is this subjective understanding that should affect their retirement decision. In our previous work, we document that incentive measures based on the self-reports are strongly related to individuals' retirement decisions. (Chan and Stevens, 2004) .
Summary statistics of key variables for the sample used in the analysis are shown in Table 1 . The first two columns in the table are based on the final year in which individuals in our analysis sample are observed. This is the year of 6 We obtain very similar results to those reported below if we drop job losses resulting from layoffs and focus only on the effects of business closings. 7 An alternative approach would be to use the employer-reports from wave 1, and assume that job losses reduce the pension component of the option value incentive to zero. This also requires eliminating individuals who voluntarily change jobs following the first wave. Our basic results are not changed by this strategy. By the end of our sample, 28 percent of men and 21 percent have women have retired, as shown in the first row of Table 1 . Average earnings (among those not retired) are approximately $30,000 for men and $27,000 for women, in 1998 dollars. Average household asset levels (including housing and business assets) are approximately $350,000 for men and $280,000 for women. Making use of information on all job losses between the first and fourth waves, 16 percent of men and 17 percent of women have experienced a job loss due to a business closing or layoff by the end of our sample period. The average age of our sample members is approximately 60 for men and 59 for women by wave 4 of the survey.
At the bottom of Table 1 we provide information on the mean and distribution of our calculated option value. Roughly 17-19 percent of men and women have a zero option value, implying that they are beyond the peak of their utility-retirement age profile. We next present some regression results relating displacement to option value and its components.
The Effects of Job Loss on Retirement Incentives
Wages
Probably the most widely studied effect of displacement on individual workers is that of reduced wages.
8 Job loss may produce significant changes in workers' forecasts of future labor income opportunities, even once they are reemployed. Simple summary statistics confirm the significant negative impact of displacement on wages among older workers. Of those in our sample who are reemployed after job loss, half receive wages that are at least 30 percent below their pre-displacement wages, and almost a quarter see their wages halved. In contrast, workers who do not suffer a job loss have relatively constant wages across survey waves.
We estimate the effects of job loss on earnings potential using all wage observations from 1992 and later, and fixed effects regressions to control for both observable and unobservable worker characteristics that might be correlated with displacement probabilities. Earnings from jobs ending prior to 1992 are eliminated because of concerns about the accuracy of retrospective information. The dependent variable is the log of annual salary based on full-year full-time work: individuals are asked how much they earn on a given job and how many hours they usually work at theis job, and these reports are converted to annual wages. This means we are ignoring the portion of earnings losses due to part-year unemployment or part-year work. Our goal is to isolate the effect of job loss on individuals' potential for future earnings, and so we abstract from short-run hours reduction and unemployment.
The effects of job loss on wages are summarized in Table 2 . As expected, for men, there are large and persistent effects: wages are immediately reduced by 50 percent, and remain 23 percent below the level expected in the absence of displacement after six or more years. We present these results simply as a description of the observed wage opportunities for those workers who do return to work, since the problem of selection into reemployment is undoubtedly more severe for older displaced workers than for displaced workers in general. Women also experience wage losses, with wages initially reduced by 48 percent, though these effects are much smaller in later years. By five or more years after job loss, these coefficients for women are very imprecisely estimated, reflecting the relatively small numbers of women who both displaced and re-employed before the end of our sample.
These wage reductionss point to the first component of the effect of job loss on workers' gains to deferring retirement. There is less gain to continued work because of the sharp reductions in wages often associated with postdisplacement jobs. For comparison with our later results on asset and pension measures and because we cannot reject the hypothesis that the six indicators for years-after-job-loss in Table 2 are equal to each other, the first row of Table 3 shows the results of a simpler specification of the effects of displacement on wages. This simplified specification includes only one indicator variable for a previous job loss. The average wage reductions over all years following job loss is 41 percent for men and 38 percent for women.
Assets
The effect of job loss on savings and assets is an issue of particular concern for those close to typical retirement ages and is less well documented than the effects of displacement on wages. The loss of income associated with displacement may alter planned accumulation of savings for retirement. It is not immediately clear how changes in these asset levels will affect the retirement decision in our model since it enters our utility function in a very non-linear fashion. The second row of Table 3 shows the effects of displacement on stocks These estimates are based on fixed effects regressions that include controls for the calendar year, age, health and marital status. While the point estimates suggest a sizable reduction in assets following job loss for both men and women, none of these effects are close to statistical significance.
Pension Wealth
We next examine the private pension-related component of the option value to continued work. One expectation is that, among this population of older workers, it will be relatively rare for individuals to completely lose their pensions when they experience a job loss since most of them will be fully vested in their pension plans. Some simple tabulations of survey responses in the HRS show that indeed, relatively few workers lose their pensions with job loss.
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Among recently displaced workers, only 5.5 percent of those with defined benefit pensions on their previous job, and 2.5 percent of those with defined contribution pensions report having lost the pension. The vast majority of those with defined benefit plans on the pre-displacement job (76 percent) report that they are either currently receiving benefits from the previous job pension, or will in the future. Another 19 percent of this group report that they received a cash settlement for their pension at the time of the job loss. Among displaced workers who had a defined contribution (DC) pension, 59 percent report that they either rolled over the DC pension into an IRA, or left the money in the account to continue accumulating. A quarter of those with DC pensions say that they received a cash settlement for their pension when they left their jobs.
In the third row of Table 3 , we examine the effect of displacement on the level of pension wealth assuming a retirement age of 65.
11 As shown in the table, there is no statistically significant effect of job loss on the level of pension wealth summarized in this way. Similar results are obtained using the present value evaluated at alternative retirement ages. This confirms that there is not a strong relationship between a recent job loss and the pension wealth available to workers.
Option Value and Pension Gain
Job loss can still have an important impact on the retirement decision via private pensions, even when job loss has no effect on the level of retirement wealth. The relevant question is whether displacement alters the accumulation 9 Excluding home equity does not change our results. 10 See Chan and Stevens (2001b) for more detail on how pension eligibility and amounts are affected by job loss. 11 Reductions in pension wealth at age 65 could come about if workers are displaced prior to a kink in their age-pension benefit profile, and so receive lower benefits per year, for example, due to leaving the firm at an earlier than optimal age. pattern of pensions. The fourth row of Table 3 looks at the effect of job loss on the "pension gain" from delaying retirement: the difference in the present value of pension wealth if retirement occurs immediately versus if it is deferred until pension wealth is maximized. For men, we see significant effects of displacement on this retirement incentive measure: the gain in pension wealth from deferring retirement among men is significantly reduced by more than $24,000 following job loss. For women, the estimated reduction is approximately $5,000, but this is not statistically significant. These effects of job loss on earnings and pension gain suggest that job loss should have a significant effect on the decision to retire.
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Finally, we estimate the effect of displacement on workers' option value, calculated as described in section 1. For men, there are statistically significant negative effects of job loss on option value: an effect that is almost as large as moving a worker from the 10 th to the 75 th percentile of the option value distribution. For women, in contrast, the effect of job loss on option value is estimated to be positive and insignificant. The positive effect is surprising, but is estimated very imprecisely. One possible reason for these results is that most females in our sample do not have a private pension. For those without private pensions, there is obviously no loss in pension gain (and no reduction in the pension component of option value), as a result of displacement. It is also the case that displaced women are even less likely than non-displaced women to have had pensions. Only 35% women who experience a job loss during our sample frame have an employer-provided pension as of wave 1 while the fraction of women with pensions among those not displaced is 45%. Roughly 58% of men (displaced or not) have employer provided pensions.
Taken together, the results in Tables 2 and 3 illustrate mechanisms through which job loss can affect individuals' optimal retirement date. Because job loss alters workers' earnings and pension provisions (at least for men), it also alters the option value to delaying retirement and thus should affect the timing of retirement.
The Effects of Job Loss on the Retirement Decision
We next examine the direct relationship between job loss and retirement, focusing on how displacement-induced changes in financial retirement incentives affect retirement behavior. The first column of Table 4 shows the effect of having a previous job loss on the probability of making a transition to retirement. Our 12 We have also considered whether there is an effect of displacement on Social Security benefits. This could happen if displacement affects the average of a worker's highest 35 quarters of earnings. In practice, we find no evidence of a significant reduction in estimated Social Security benefits from displacement. dependent variable reflects whether or not the individual retired in the previous year. Specifically, individuals are retired if they answered yes to a question asking if they are "completely retired." In addition to a variable indicating a previous job loss, we include controls for health, marital status, availability of retiree health insurance, education, race, and a series of dummy variables for age and for calendar year. 
Women
Since retirement is a one-time event, the results for retirement behavior cannot be controlled for individual fixed effects (unlike our results in the previous section). This raises a concern that any results may be biased due to failure to control for unobserved permanent factors that are correlated with both the probability of retirement and our independent variables of interest. 13 In order to control for potential heterogeneity in unobserved tastes for retirement, we make use of information on individuals' subjective retirement expectations from wave 13 While other research on the effects of displacement typically includes fixed effects out of concern that displaced workers may have unobserved characteristics that are correlated with wages, employment propensities, etc., the research on determinants of retirement is generally not able to do this. One exception is Chan and Stevens (2004) where we use a novel approach with data on repeatedly observed retirement expectations. We find that retirement equations identified from cross-sectional variation in option value may be biased due to unobserved factors that are correlated with both option value measures and tastes for retirement. 1; specifically, wave 1 responses to the question, "what is the probability that you will continue to work full time after age 62?" So that we can have a measure of retirement expectations elicited prior to any job loss in the sample period, we drop wave 1 observations from the analysis here and use only individual-year observations starting in wave 2 in which the person has not already retired or has just retired in the past year. In this and all subsequent specifications, the coefficient on these expectations for work is negative and significant: those who have a higher expectation of working at age 62 have lower probabilities of retirement. Excluding this retirement expectations variable from the specification has little effect on any of the estimates, however.
Column 1 of Table 4 shows that, as expected, having a recent job loss significantly increases the probability of retirement in the current year. For men, the coefficient on the variable for a previous job loss is 0.849, indicating an increase in the annual probability of retirement of approximately 5 percentage points.
14 The annual probability of retirement for not displaced workers is just over 4 percent, so displacement doubles the probability of retirement each year. For women, the coefficient for a previous displacement of 0.743 suggests an increase in the probability of retirement of over 3 percentage points, again roughly doubling the probability of retirement in each year. A recent job loss substantially increases the probability of retiring from the labor force.
Option value is next used to explain the probability of retirement. The second column of Table 4 shows the results of estimating a logit model for retirement, including option value measures and the same set of controls as noted above. We include option value, and a dummy variable indicating that option value is equal to zero to allow for possible non-linearities in the effect of the option value measure around zero. The coefficient on option value for men is -0.634 and is statistically significant. To interpret this coefficient, consider the effect of increasing the option value from the median to the 75 th percentile of the distribution. For men, this would lead to a reduction in the annual probability of retirement of 1.2 percentage points. For women, a movement from the median to the 75 th percentile would lead to a reduction in the annual retirement probability of 0.9 percentage points. The coefficient for having a zero option value is close to zero and not statistically significant for men. For women, the coefficient is positive, as expected, but is not statistically significant.
The third column of Table 4 includes both option value and a variable for a past displacement in the logit for retirement. Including the option value variables, along with the displacement dummy variable, leaves the coefficients on option value virtually unchanged and reduces the estimated effect of displacement by only a tiny amount for both men and women. The coefficient on job loss when option value controls are included is not significantly different from the coefficient when controls are not included. When option value regressors are included, there continues to be an effect of displacement on retirement of roughly 5 percentage points for men, and 3 percentage points for women. This suggests that much of the increased retirement following job loss may not be financially optimal in the narrow sense of solely responding to changes in the option value of delayed retirement, as we have measured it; job loss must have strong effects on retirement, above and beyond those operating through financial retirement incentives. This remaining effect of displacement is equivalent to an additional reduction in option value from the median value to zero. That is, for a person with the median incentive to continue work after displacement (as measured by option value), there is a further effect of displacement that is equivalent to moving from the median incentive to having a zero incentive to continue working.
As noted above, we have replicated these results using only job losses resulting from plant or business closings. In this specification, the coefficient on job loss if estimated at .72 when no option value variables are included, and remains very close to this value when incentive measures are added.
One possible reason why the effect of displacement is barely diminished by controlling for option value is that we have not accurately captured displaced workers' true earnings possibilities. In calculating the option value for workers following displacement, one challenge is that we must assign a wage for displaced workers who have not yet become re-employed. To capture the phenomenon of reduced earnings potential following displacement, we assign displaced and unemployed workers the earnings that might be expected after displacement, based on the average losses experienced by displaced and reemployed workers. However, even reduced earnings may not be available if displaced workers are unable to secure new employment.
To explore this possibility, we calculate an alternative version of the option value variable for displaced workers where the probability of returning to work is less than one. In this alternative specification, expected earnings for displaced workers are equal to the observed probability of returning to work multiplied by their (reduced) earnings. This is a way of incorporating the idea that displaced workers may not expect to have much in the way of future earnings. For an estimate of the probability of receiving any future earnings, we turn to probabilities generated by previous work on employment transitions following displacement (see Chan and Stevens, 2001a) . Our assumption is that workers will base their expectations of future income on a probability of securing new employment given their age and other characteristics. For example, the probability of returning to work for a 55-year-old man after one year out of work is 0.53. These probabilities are likely to understate the possibility of returning to work since they combine the effects of being unable to return to work with the effects of being unwilling to return to work at the offered wage. This scenario thus provides contrast with our previous assumption that displaced workers can return to work with certainty.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 shows the results from including this revised option value variable (labeled "option value II"), along with the displacement dummy in the retirement logit. While the effect of displacement is reduced by slightly more, it still does not differ significantly from the full effect of displacement in column one.
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Another way to examine the way in which job loss affects retirement is to combine the directly estimated effect of job loss on option value from Table 3 with the effect of option value on retirement. Taking the amount by which job loss reduces option value from Table 3 , and multiplying it by the coefficient on option value from Table 4 column 2, implies that a job loss should increase the probability of retirement by approximately 2 percentage points for men. However, the overall effect of job loss on retirement from Table 4 column 1 is 5 percentage points. While this method suggests that a slightly larger proportion (than that based on the Table 4 results alone) of the job loss effect could operate through changes in option value, there remains a 3 percentage point increase in annual retirement rates that cannot be the result of displacement induced changes in option value. Unfortunately, the imprecisely estimated (and wrong-signed) effects of displacement on option value for women mean that this exercise is not informative for women. This exercise helps to emphasize a fairly simple interpretation of our findings to this point; the estimated impact of displacement on retirement incentive measures is simply to small to explain a substantial fraction of the changes in retirement probabilities.
To better isolate the pension component of retirement incentives, columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 repeat the analysis using pension gain. For both men and women, the zero pension gain coefficient is positive and significant. This suggests that non-linearities in pension-related incentives to retire may be quite important. Similar to the results based on option value, when displacement is added in column 7, the coefficients on pension gain change are not changed and the coefficient on displacement is reduced by a relatively small amount from that in column 1. The change in the displacement coefficient is now larger than in the specifications that added the option value variable. Including the pension gain 15 This exercise is only suggestive of the effects that employment barriers may have and some caution is required in interpreting the coefficients on this option value II measure. The large coefficients on the variable indicating a zero option value, for example, are largely the result of our construction of this alternative option value variable. For displaced individuals who have not returned to work, we assign only a probability of having future earnings. This creates a mechanical relationship between not being at work (including those displaced workers who have retired) and the earnings component of option value. variable reduces the magnitude of the displacement effect by 12-14 percent, again suggesting that the vast majority of the effect of displacement on retirement is not captured by controlling for financial incentives to retire.
We have tried several alternative specifications of the relationships summarized in Table 4 . Because option value (and pension gain) for displaced workers will be a non-linear function of displacement, it is important to allow for non-linear effects of the incentive variables. By allowing more flexible functional forms for option value, we can provide more robust evidence that the effects of displacement do not operate solely through the incentive measures. We have include a quartic in option value, as well as a spline allowing differential impacts of option value on retirement probabilities at different percentiles of the option value distribution. None of these flexible forms alters our main result; the displacement coefficient is never reduced by more than a few percentage points when alternative functional forms of option value are included.
As mentioned above, for that portion (more than half) of our sample individuals who do not have private pensions when initially observed, pension gain and option value will not be substantially changed by job loss. Given this, it is not surprising that a large fraction of the effect of job loss is not captured by the financial incentive variables. We have repeated the analysis in Table 4 on the sub-sample of individuals who begin the sample period with employer-provided pensions. For this group, the effects of both job loss and the financial incentives are larger in magnitude, as expected. The qualitative nature of the interaction between job loss and option value (or pension gain), however, is similar to the results in Table 4 . The vast majority of the estimated effect of job loss on retirement remains robust to inclusion of controls for the financial incentives that may be directly altered by job loss.
Conclusion
It should come as no surprise that older displaced workers face significant and lasting reductions in their employment prospects. What has not been previously documented, however, is the extent to which this reflects a retirement response to reductions in the pension and earnings related changes induced by job loss. Our main finding here makes clear that very little of the reduced employment among older job losers can be explained by changes in wage and pension incentives. By combining a common empirical approach to modeling retirement with a direct examination of the effects of displacement on retirement, this paper shows that the effect of job loss is much larger than can be explained by these incentive measures.
We find important effects of job loss on the main financial components of workers' incentive to retire. Labor earnings fall sharply as does the gain in pension wealth from continued work. Fixed-effects regressions show earnings reductions after displacement of 41 and 38 percent for men and women. While the level of pension wealth is not significantly altered, the gain in pension wealth from deferring retirement is reduced by more than $24,000 for men and more than $5,000 for women. These effects reduce the total option value from delaying retirement following job loss.
These changes in financial conditions should lead to increased rates of retirement among displaced workers; however, observed rates of retirement following job loss go beyond the effects of purely financial considerations. Displaced workers retire at substantially higher rates than non-displaced workers, even after controlling for the option value of delayed retirement. Employment difficulties, high search costs, or other barriers to reemployment may be important explanations for the low employment rates of recently displaced older workers.
Appendix-Calculation of Option Value measures
In the Stock and Wise (1990) option value model of retirement, the utility function does not allow saving and borrowing between time periods. Thus, any temporary shock to earnings, which does not induce retirement during the period of the shock, has no effect on the retirement decision thereafter. There is no persistent effect of temporary shocks to earnings since consumption cannot be smoothed across time. Our focus on the impact of displacement makes this feature unappealing. Following a job loss, workers may draw on savings or debt to finance a period of job search or depressed earnings and we want to allow a role for this in the retirement decision.
We use the following option-value model which, while based upon the concept of Stock and Wise, does allow saving and borrowing across time periods. We assume that at time t, individuals maximize a lifetime utility function of the form:
where c is consumption, l is leisure, S is the termination date, and β is the subjective discount factor. The lifetime budget constraint at time t is:
where i is the real interest rate, A t is the stock of assets at time t and y s is income in period s, which depends on the retirement date R. The last term is the present value of all future income, which depends on the retirement date R. We call this Y t (R):
Following many previous applications, we assume that the period utility function u(c s , l s ) is additively separable in consumption and leisure, so that we can write V t as:
We assume leisure l t is either 0 or 1: l t = 0 when t < R , before retirement l t = 1 when t ≥ R , after retirement and we normalize: u
i.e., the utility of leisure takes on a fixed value, and is independent of income. We further assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function with risk aversion parameter 1/α. Thus, we can rewrite the decision as:
We assume the subjective discount rate is equal to the real interest rate (i.e., 1/(1+i) = β). With this equality and our assumption of time-separable utility, consumption in each period will be equal to the present value of lifetime resources divided by the total number of time periods weighted by the discount factor: Thus, we have a utility function that depends on the present value of lifetime resources plus a measure of utility derived from leisure during retirement. Saving and borrowing allow transfers between each period, and the retirement decision is no longer constrained by consuming current period income.
16 Individuals now chose the retirement age (R) that will maximize their lifetime utility. 16 This setup is similar in spirit to that of Stock and Wise. Their functional form is power utility with parameter γ and the value of leisure expressed as a multiplicative factor k on retirement benefits during retirement. Empirical implementation of the retirement decision suggested by [9] is relatively straightforward and is identical to that used in Chan and Stevens (2004) . Information on asset holdings, A t , comes directly from the HRS data. We obtain income at each possible possible retirement date Y it (R) by summing income components from before and after retirement:
where the first term is the expected present value of income while working based and the second term is the expected present value of income while retired.
In order to estimate the former, we need to forecast future earnings. We do this by using earnings information from current jobs and from job histories available in the Health and Retirement Study. We deflate these earnings and estimate a fixed-effects regression, including a fourth order polynomial in age. The age effects are then used to predict earnings growth at each age from 50 to 75. Not surprisingly, wage profiles are very flat for workers age 50 and over. Once retired, expected income will depend on the retirement date, pension benefits and benefit timing rules. For this forecast, we use information on when pension benefits will begin, how pensions continue to accrue from the employer while employed and the amounts of pension benefits to be received.
One complication in calculating future earnings for displaced workers is the need to estimate future earnings for individuals who are displaced and currently unemployed. To begin, we assume that unemployed displaced workers can return to work with a probability equal to one and that they will receive earnings that are reduced from their pre-displacement level by the average amounts estimated from reemployed displaced workers. We note that the predicted earnings for unemployed displaced workers are likely to overstate their expected future earnings because the earnings losses are estimated only for the sample of individuals who do return to work: we should expect those who are not reemployed to face worse wage opportunities. We later relax the assumption that displaced workers can return to work with certainty.
The latter term of [10] requires a forecast of pension benefits at each possible retirement age. As noted in the body of the paper, we rely on selfreported pension information in order to do this. For each pension plan in the HRS, individuals are first asked whether their pension plan is DB or DC or "both". The respondent's answer dictates whether they are given the DC or the First order conditions would have that consumption is equal in all periods, i.e., C w =C r , and thus we have our equation [6] where our U L corresponds to their ln(k). DB sets of questions described below; in the case of "both", questions relating to the DC and DB components are asked.
For DC plans, respondents are asked what they and their employer regularly contribute to the account, as well as the current balance in the account. We assume that these contribution rates remain constant while the individual is working for this employer. We also assume that the investment return is 8% for investments in stocks, and 3% otherwise (our results are not sensitive to this assumption). This allows us to project the balance in the DC account at each possible retirement date.
For DB plans, respondents are asked a series of questions about how their benefits will be determined. In order to calculate what benefits will be at each possible retirement age, we make particular use of, "What is the earliest age at which you would be eligible to receive full or unreduced pension benefits from this job?" (referred to below as full benefits) and "What is the earliest age at which you could leave this employer and start to receive pension benefits?" (referred to below as reduced benefits). Associated with each of these are questions that ascertain how much the benefits will be. In the case of reduced benefits, the response could be expressed as the percentage reduction from full benefits. If the respondent ever expresses the benefits as a percentage of pay, we use the earnings predictions that were described earlier in this appendix. The combination of these questions allow us to predict what DB benefits will be at each possible retirement age: the full benefits amount for retirement ages on or after the full benefits age, reduced benefits for retirement ages on or after the reduced benefits age but before the full benefits age, and zero for retirement ages before the reduced benefits age.
Following the approach used in Samwick (1998) these DB benefit levels and DC pension wealth levels are discounted at a real rate of 3 percent, and adjusted for gender specific survival rates.
17 Based on survival tables, we set the terminal age S to be 119 years old. Following many applications, we set α equal to 1/2. Our results described in the text are not sensitive to this choice of discount rate or risk aversion parameter. Finally, we calibrate U L by choosing the U L which produces a simulated distribution of retirement dates consistent with observed retirement dates in the HRS sample. 17 An alternative is to estimate the full dynamic programming model by maximum likelihood. Samwick (1998) assumes values for the discount rate and utility function parameters, noting identification difficulties in precisely estimating both parameters. This approach was also considered in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) who found that such models do capture many of the key features of the dynamic retirement model, although they may be inferior in predictive power to the fully structural model.
